Savulescu has recently introduced the "rational non-interventional paternalist" model of the patient-doctor relationship.
The role of the doctor within the patient-doctor relationship is changing. In his recent article in this journal,2 Savulescu introduces the concept of "rational non-interventional paternalism", whereby "doctors ought to make value judgments about what is best for their patients, not just in a medical sense, but in an overall sense". This involves consideration of the life circumstances of the patient, his/her values, and all other things central to his/her being, in addition to his/her medical facts, in order to form an "all-things-considered judgment of what is best". Such practice introduces conceptual and practical difficulties which I will address from the perspective of a practising anaesthetist. My main aim is to clarify the importance of active choice in the establishment of autonomy. Sometimes doctors are required to encourage patients to make their own choices.
Medical facts and other facts
Central to Savulescu's 
Evaluative medical judgments and patient choice
Savulescu rightly criticises the current model of the patient-doctor relationship in which the doctor's role is confined to "fact-provider". This falls short of encompassing the processes of interaction, facilitation and reassurance. More importantly, it disregards the need for an evaluative judgment ofwhat is best for the patient in a medical sense. As Savulescu notes, "medicine as a practice is founded on commitment to certain values". These "medical values" are both historical and evolving. For example, they have developed to include not only "pain is bad", "longer life is usually better than shorter life", but also concepts such as quality of life and the notion of a good death.
Medical values direct the doctor's desired outcome of medical management. Such values make it possible to form an evaluative medical judgment.
My approach to patient choice is as a "medical advisor" rather than either a fact-provider or a rational non-interventional paternalist. As 
Requirements of the patient-doctor relationship
Models of the patient-doctor relationship have shifted from paternalism to shared decision-making, with both patient and doctor active and essential in determining the best course of action.5 Shared decision-making might be seen to encompass a spectrum of degrees of sharing, with the "fact provider" at one end and patient-doctor consensus at the other. Neither rational non-interventional paternalism nor the "medical advisor" model denies the process of shared decision-making. Their difference lies in the balance of responsibility. Whilst Savulescu's model allows the patient to persuade the doctor of the right choice, responsibility for decision-making is invested in the doctor: "Since medical practice involves serious harm to others, as well as benefit, doctors ought to form a judgment of what ought to be done, all things considered." The "medical advisor" model emphasises the act of choosing. Responsibility for choice lies with the patient. Not only should we respect patients' choices as a manifestation of their autonomy, we should encourage patients to make their own choices because that is essential to being autonomous.
Two requirements of the patient-doctor relationship are the ability to achieve the right outcome and the promotion of patient autonomy. Savulescu 
Practical objections
The practice of rational non-interventional paternalism has some problems.
First, it implies the doctor is the better judge of what is best for the patient all-things-considered. Even given that this is true in some cases, it is hard to imagine that it is always the case. Patients may not be prepared to surrender all their values to the scrutiny of the doctor. Furthermore, for the doctor fully to achieve the patient's insight he must adopt an internal perspective, so weakening his external view. In the extreme this would be like a doctor treating himself. Such loss of objectivity threatens not only his ability to form an evaluative medical judgment, but also the capacity to promote his patient's ability to choose, by impeding the processes of rational argument, reassurance and so on.
Second, Savulescu does not make clear how far the process of rational argument should go. He draws the line at "compelling" but not at "convincing" patients. Assuming the obese patient is competent to choose, for how long must his doctor argue that spinal anaesthesia is the best choice? What if Mrs X agrees immediately to her doctor's all-thingsconsidered judgment that she should cancel her trip? Knowing how important her grandchildren are to her, should her doctor now engage Mrs X in rational argument to be satisfied that this is "her choice"? Third, the use of rational argument may mean doctors "bully" their patients into accepting the proposed best course of action. Submission might be encouraged in patients who hold their doctor in esteem. Doctors who develop sophisticated techniques for argument will dominate decision-making.
Patients who are unable to present their values in rational terms may be coerced into accepting a rational course of action.
Fourth, rational non-interventional paternalism is time-consuming for both patient and doctor. It necessarily involves long journeys into the realms of the patient's privacy. While the "medical advisor" sleeps soundly at night, confident her patient is well equipped to deliberate a decision, Savulescu (if he gets home at all) must toss and turn as he struggles to form the best all-things-considered judgment.
Conclusion
Savulescu is right to criticise the current model of the doctor as a "fact provider". It 
